

Message Text

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11 R
ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 INR-10 SP-03 SS-20 L-03 H-03

PM-07 SAM-01 SAJ-01 EB-11 IO-14 RSC-01 DRC-01 /115 W
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R 260935Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2907
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 8434

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CH, JA
SUBJECT: SULLIVAN'S PERIL

REFS: (A) MANILA 6127
(B) HONG KONG 6603
(C) STATE 135797

1. WE APPLAUD THE SPEED WITH WHICH EA, TOGETHER WITH S/P AND INR, HAS SORTED OUT ITS OWN THOUGHTS ON AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN'S PROVOCATIVE THESIS, AND REGRET THAT WE WERE NOT MORE PROMPT IN RISING TO THE CHALLENGE. (REF C ARRIVED ON THE DAY THIS MESSAGE WAS TYPED IN FINAL) NONETHELESS, ALTHOUGH OUR VIEWS CLOSELY PARALLEL THOSE OF EA AND HONG KONG, WE OFFER THE RESULTS OF OUR ANALYSIS IF ONLY AS EVIDENCE THAT WE WERE NOT INDIFFERENT TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES RAISED.

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2. IN OUR VIEW, THERE IS NO COMPELLING EVIDENCE AT PRESENT TIME THAT PEKING'S LONG-TERM INTENTIONS IN ASEAN AREA ARE TO ELIMINATE OR SEVERELY LIMIT US AND JAPANESE INFLUENCE (WE AGREE WITH RESPECT TO USSR). MOREOVER, QUESTION IS PROBABLY MOOT BECAUSE SUCH ATTEMPT WOULD NOT ONLY FAIL BUT CARRY WITHIN ITSELF SEEDS OF GRAVE SETBACK TO CHINESE INTERESTS. NO CHINESE CAMPAIGN TO ACHIEVE HEGEMONY IN ASEAN AREA, HOWEVER SUBTLE OR INGENUOUS, COULD LONG REMAIN UNNOTICED OR MISUNDERSTOOD BY ALL POWERS CONCERNED, AND COUNTERACTIONS WOULD IMMEDIATELY RESULT.

3. POSITION OF USSR IS OF COURSE VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF US OR JAPAN: LATTER TWO ARE ALREADY ENTRENCHED AS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND/OR MILITARY POWERS IN REGION; USSR IS NOT. CONSENSUS OF US, JAPAN PERHAPS CHINA AND PROBABLY ASEAN NATIONS IS THAT USSR SHOULD IN FUTURE BE PERMITTED ECONOMIC ROLE, PERHAPS TOLERATED WITHIN NARROW LIMITS IN POLITICAL SPHERE, BUT DEFINITELY FORECLOSED FROM MILITARY PRESENCE. WE BELIEVE EXCESSIVE SOVIET OVERTURES TO SEAN NATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVELY REBUFFED, THAT USSR WILL NOT BECOME MAJOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN AREA, AND WE THEREFORE ELIMINATE USSR FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN THIS COMMENTARY.

4. WE FULLY AGREE THAT OUR MILITARY BASES IN AREA ARE VULNERABLE BECAUSE THEY ARE SOURCES OF LOCAL IRRITATION AND AT LEAST HYPOTHETICAL OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVEMENT OF ZONE OF PEACE AND NEUTRALITY. HOWEVER, PEKING APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED THAT IN NEAR TERM, US MILITARY PRESENCE (OF WHICH BASES ARE ESSENTIAL PART) EFFECTIVELY INHIBITS ENTRY OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCE, AND THEREFORE IT PRAGMATICALLY ACCEPTS SITUATION WHICH IS TACTICALLY IF NOT IDEOLOGICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS. AT THIS JUNCTURE WE WOULD CALL ATTENTION TO DILEMMA WHICH PRC FACES IN SEVERAL SECTORS: TO ACHIEVE SHORT-TERM GOALS, PEKING IS INCLINED TO ACCEPT OR EVEN ENCOURAGE US AND JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN ASEAN AREA AS ESSENTIAL COUNTERS TO

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SOVIET DESIGNS, BUT BY SAME TOKEN, US AND JAPAN WILL BE THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT--PERHAPS IMPOSSIBLE-- TO DISLODGE ONCE THEY HAVE SERVED THEIR SHORT-TERM PURPOSE (FROM PEKING'S POINT OF VIEW).

5. ON ECONOMIC FRONT, WE QUESTION PEKING'S CAPACITY FOR MISCHIEF. AS SOURCES OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY FOR

AGRIBUSINESS AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, AS MARKETS FOR EXPORTS AND SUPPLIERS OF COMPETITIVELY PRICED AND RELIABLE MANUFACTURES, US AND JAPAN CAN PROBABLY NOT BE MATCHED FROM VIEWPOINT OF ASEAN NATIONS. EUROPEANS WOULD PROVIDE VERY LIMITED ALTERNATIVE. IN DRAWING UP BALANCE SHEET TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH US AND JAPAN IN ECONOMIC SECTOR, OR ALTERNATIVELY ALIENATE US BY UNCOMPENSATED NATIONALIZATIONS AND ACCEPTANCE OF SHORT TERM BLANDISHMENTS FROM PEKING, ASEAN MUST DECIDE THAT THE CHOICE IS OBVIOUS.

6. EVIDENCE ABOUNDS THAT ASEAN NATIONS ARE NOW THINKING IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING THEIR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH US AND JAPAN. AS MOST RECENT EXAMPLE, WE WOULD CITE FIRST QTE SOUTHEAST ASIAN BUSINESSMEN'S MEETING UNQTE JUST CONCLUDED IN TOKYO, WHICH BROUGHT TOGETHER TOP LEVEL BUSINESSMEN AND BANKERS FROM SEASIA AND JAPAN TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND HOW THEIR NATIONAL ECONOMIES WILL INTERRELATE IN WORLD ECONOMY OF 1970'S. THEY DISCUSSED, INTER ALIA, DEVELOPMENT OF INTRAREGIONAL INDUSTRIES AND HOW JAPAN'S HIGHLY DEVELOPED BUSINESS INFORMATION AND MARKETING SYSTEMS COULD BE UTILIZED BY SEASIANS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTE THAT AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN'S INITIAL MESSAGE AND DEPARTMENT'S THOUGHTFUL RESPONSE DID NOT TOUCH ON THESE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT WOULD BIND SEASIA TO JAPAN AND US RATHER THAN DIVIDE US OR PROVIDE PRC WITH OPPORTUNITY TO INSERT WEDGE.

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

THIS LEADS TO WHAT WE VIEW AS MOST EFFECTIVE BARRIER TO ANY CHINESE EFFORTS TO OUST US AND JAPAN AND ESTABLISH HEGEMONY IN AREA: ASEAN NATIONS THEMSELVES. WE ARE IMPRESSED WITH WAY ASEAN NATIONS HAVE TAKEN CHARGE OF THEIR OWN AFFAIRS, EXHIBITING DEGREE OF COHESION (HOWEVER IMPERFECT) AND SENSE OF PURPOSE. THEIR APPROACH TO JAPANESE ON SYNTHETIC RUBBER PRODUCTION IS CASE IN POINT, THOUGH MORE FOR SYMBOLIC THAN PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE. WE BELIEVE POLICY OF BALKANIZATION, WHATEVER SUCCESS IT MAY HAVE HAD IN INDOCHINA, WILL FAIL IN ASEAN AREA BECAUSE MOMENTUM TOWARD COMMON ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SECURITY POLICIES IS PROBABLY TOO STRONG TO BE DISSIPATED OR REVERSED. POLICY MOST LIKELY TO BACKFIRE WOULD BE PRC ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE OVERSEAS CHINESE. RECENT CONFIDENTIAL

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HISTORY SHOWS THAT WHETHER OVERSEAS CHINESE REAP TRIUMPH OR TRAGEDY DEPENDS ON WHETHER THEY SEEK ASSIMILATION OR AT LEAST ACCOMMODATION WITH LOCAL POPULATIONS, OR CHOOSE TO INSIST ON SEPARATENESS AND INVOLABLE RIGHTS AS THEY CONSTRUE THEM. MALAY ATTACKS ON MALAYSIA'S CHINESE COMMUNITY IN 1969 AND CIRCUMSCRIBED POLITICAL ROLE PERMITTED CHINESE COMMUNITY IN MALAYSIA ARE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF BUILT-IN CURBS TO EXCESSIVE POLITICAL INFLUENCE BY CHINESE IN ASEAN COUNTRIES, CURBS WHICH WOULD ONLY BE INCREASED IF PEKING ACTIVELY SUPPORTED LOCAL CHINESE COMMUNITIES AGAINST INTERESTS OF HOST GOVERNMENTS. WE THINK LESSON HAS BEEN LEARNED, AND THAT VAST MAJORITY OF OVERSEAS CHINESE WOULD NOT RISK APPEARING TO BE PEKING'S PAWNS IN INFLUENCING POLICIES OF THEIR ADOPTED COUNTRIES. FINALLY, IF US AND JAPANESE COLONIALISM IN AREA HAS BEEN RESENTED, HOW MUCH MORE VEHEMENTLY SOUTHEAST ASIANS MUST REACT TO CONTROLS EXERTED IN PART THROUGH FIFTH COLUMN IN THEIR MIDST.

8. AS FOR JAPANESE VIEWS, FONOFF CHINA DIVISION HAS

ANALYZED PEKING'S ATTITUDES AND OBJECTIVES IN ASEAN AREA AS FOLLOWS: (A) PRC RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIAN NEIGHBORS ARE AMONG WEAKEST OF ITS GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS ANYWHERE IN WORLD, AND PEKING WISHES TO RECTIFY THIS ANOMALOUS SITUATION; (B) PEKING SEEKS NO ORGANIZATIONAL ROLE IN NEUTRALIZING SEASIA, BUT SUPPORTS THIS EVENTUAL GOAL, WHILE IN SHORT TERM RAISING NO OBJECTION TO PRESENCE OF US TROOPS ELSEWHERE THAN INDOCHINA; (C) PEKING STRONGLY DESIRES TO LIMIT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AREA; (D) PEKING'S PRIMARY GOALS IN AREA ARE NOT ECONOMIC.

9. FONOFF ASSERTS THAT RECENT EXPERIENCE PROVIDES LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT CHINA REGARDS JAPAN (OR US) AS RIVAL IN SEASIA. GENERAL ABSENCE OF ANTI-JAPANESE THEMES FROM PRC PROPAGANDA BEAMED AT SEASIA, AND LACK OF REPORTS THAT CHINESE OFFICIALS CRITICIZE JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN SEASIA WHEN TALKING WITH ASIAN VISITORS, PROVIDE NEGATIVE EVIDENCE THAT CHINA

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DOES NOT NOW SEE ITSELF AS ENGAGED IN COMPETITION WITH JAPAN FOR INFLUENCE IN AREA. ON ECONOMIC FRONT, EXPORTS OF TWO COUNTRIES ARE NOW COMPLEMENTARY, THOUGH FONOFF CONCEDES THAT IN FUTURE PRC COULD CHOOSE TO DUMP GOODS OR IN OTHER WAYS UNDERMINE SEGMENTS OF JAPAN'S EXISTING TRADE RELATIONSHIPS.

10. WITH RESPECT TO JAPANESE VIEWS, WE WOULD ONLY ADD THAT MAJORITY, INCLUDING RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS AND OPINION MAKERS, ARE THINKING MUCH MORE IN TERMS OF COOPERATING THAN COMPETING WITH CHINA. WHETHER SUCH COOPERATION WILL EVENTUATE, AND IN WAYS DETRIMENTAL TO US INTERESTS, IS QUESTION WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ADDRESS HERE, BUT--PACE KAISER WILHELM--WE ARE PROFOUNDLY SKEPTICAL THAT INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONDITIONS WOULD PROMPT OR PERMIT JAPAN, EITHER ALONE OR IN CONCERT WITH CHINA, TO CREATE SOME UPDATED GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE.

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